#### To obtain the right to housing, people are forced to adhere to heteronormative conceptions of the “ideal” nuclear family, which ensures discrimination and surveillance against those deemed “deviant”

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The federal government's complicity in racial discrimination in the development and administration of housing policy has been well documented,1 but the government's role in reproducing gendered federal housing policies in the United States has been largely unrecognized in political science. U.S. housing policy in the twentieth century is inextricably linked to perceptions of gender and the single family home, and the traditional nuclear family has been rendered a hegemonic entity. The politics of housing cannot be understood without an analysis of the effects that conceptions of gender have had on housing policy and in turn of the effects of such policy on the cultural and social norms surrounding gender. Although current housing policies reflect changed policy commitments from politically conservative administrations, pres Refraining Gendered Social Policy Feminist readings of US. social policy and welfare-state regimes have shed new light on structural imbalances and bias? based on gender, race, and social class present in the development of the American administrative state.2 These accounts implicitly or explicitly draw from T.H. Marshall's views of citizenship in which full membership in a national community extends from civic and political citizenship to social citizenship that involves access to basic economic security as a requirement to access political and civic rights.3 Scholars who examine national political regimes use a variation of social citizenship to include governance, which is an understanding of the relationships of citizens to political institutions and public policies.4 Thus, the creation of public policy in democratic regimes is not neutral, ent access to housing remains family composition specific, which means that gender, alongside the more commonly recognized factors of race and class is an integral part of the complex policy making matrix. Contemporary federal low-income housing programs continue to bear the mark of early housing pro The politics of housing cannot be understood without an analysis of the effects tha t conceptions of gender have had on housing policy and in turn of the effects of such policy on the cultural and social norms surrounding gender but rather has been shaped historically through a web of interest groups, private actors, and the commitments of political institutions. One consequence of this process in the United States has been that separate groups (women, men, blacks, immigrants) have been ascribed different civic rights based on the meanings and responsibilities attached to those groups and the roles grams, characterized by nuclear family and single-family home rhetoric organized around a male-breadwinner model, and thus reinforces the nuclear-family ideal. Nuclear-family-centered ideology crystallized in the 1920s under the Hoover administration, escalated in the 1950s through suburbanization and urban disinvestment, and developed into policymaking that was increasingly punitive in the 1990s for those outside the nuclear- and nuptial-family norm. Although federal housing policies have been shaped by numerous competing interests, the nuclear family has acted as the legitimate norm around which policy has been organized. Both the federal government and the courts have contributed to this gendered structure of housing policy; the federal government, through the creation of public policies and the sup port of private business interests and the courts through the adjudication of housing-related issues, both of which tolerate, nurture, and endorse gender-stratified policies. Obtaining and maintaining housing relies on the performance of gender, and, more specifically, on the formation of nuclear or quasi-nuclear families. to which they are relegated in private and public life. Public policies have been shaped around different commitments of welfare state regimes, and the relationship of gender to housing policy has been an important, but under examined, part of this story. Most salient to this is the interlinkage of the male bread winner model and modern welfare regimes5 and in particular how social provisions have developed in the United States based on the way in which the aid is perceived by policy makers, the public, and the groups that receive the benefits.6 Typically, social provisions developed for men and workers are administered at the federal level with standardized rules. In contrast, policies for women and children have been relegated to state administration, permit more extensive evaluation and surveillance, and are assigned based on conceptions of who is considered deserving and who is not? From a scriptive and social characteristics. Lawmaking, economic conditions, and social institutions are often treated as mutually exclusive in the policymaking realm; however, the practices work together to shape our social and political reality. Although the federal government supports numerous types of housing through a combination of state subsidies, tax expenditures and mortgage financing, the single-family home has been and remains the zenith of housing policy, The success in promoting single family home ownership has not had an equal impact demographically; for minorities the picture is sobering, and for women it is equally so. While whites continue to dominate the market with a 71.3 percent homeownership rate in 2000, blacks and Hispanics are at 46.3 and 45.7 percent respectively. Asians and AIANs had the highest homeownership rates for minorities of 53.4 percent and 55.5 percent respectively. Single mothers of all races had an homeownership rate of only 49 percent, a sharp contrast to single fathers who had 69 percent. Single women without children have a growing homeownership rate, presently at 51.9 percent. This gendered housing gap is notable as the united states is among a very small group of developed countries with especially egregious housing policy that disproportionately impact women. Recent scholarship has recognized that there is a two-tiered system of housing policy in which market incentives and tax breaks are used to promote the private development of single-family homes for the middle and upper classes, while under-funded subsidies and public housing production are reserved for lower-class and indigent deserving poor. Thus, while white, middle and upper class citizens were given the “right to housing: through a combination of federal subsidies and tax break, everyone else is subjected to the unmanaged private rental market, public housing, or the intense government supervision required to access low-income housing. This also means an increased hardship for female headed households, single parent families, and unmarried individuals who need to move to geographically isolated areas to obtain affordable housing. Therefore, federal housing policy in the United States has been constructed to serve diverse groups with different types of benefits, and family has been implicated in this construction of those who are considered deserving – because they either maintain traditional nuclear and nuptial families or can afford to buy into the market – and those who are not.

#### For black bodies, the home symbolizes refuge from the constant terror from the white gaze, but white heteronormativity requires that black homes fulfill a biologically reproductive necessity that directly opposes queerness. For black queers, this “homeliness” becomes homelessness.

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Since many Black people in the USA experience and struggle against racial exclusion and oppression expressed in socio-spatial terms, home and family serve as sites of refuge, safety, and social support. For Black people, the home is represented and experienced as what hooks (1990, 41) has referred to as the ‘homeplace,’ a safe space. Homeplace is viewed as a space of shelter and refuge from and resistance against harsh urban realities to which Black people are subjected not only to race, class, and gender oppression but also to violence and exclusion. As an overcompensatory response to racist renderings of Black family formations as backward and deviant, these formations consolidate around heteropatriarchy, literally, excluding or suppressing Black gender and sexual minorities (Lubiano 1998; Johnson 2005; Bailey 2010). As a sociocultural and a material unit, the Black biological family and the home are bound together by an ideology that fetishizes the heteropatriachal nuclear family. According to Black common sense, the home is the space of reproduction and the maintenance of a (respectable) heteronormative social, gender, and sexual order (Lubiano 1998, 232). Therefore, while for some Black people the Black homeplace is a safe one, for many Black LGBT people the heteronormative home is experienced in very different – less affirming – terms. Homelessness among LGBT youth in Detroit, many of whom are Black, is a telling example of the ways in which Black LGBT people are excluded from their homeplace of origin. It is estimated that each year, 20– 40% of the 1.7 million runaway and homeless youth nationally identify as LGBT.11 In an interview I conducted with Ms Laura Hughes, Executive Director of the Ruth Ellis Center, a youth social services agency for runaway and homeless LGBT youth in Detroit, she stated that each year 2000 youth will become homeless because of their LGBT gender and sexual identities.12 Most of these LGBT youth who are homeless in Detroit are Black. And it is worth mentioning that many of the Ruth Ellis Center’s clients are LGBT members of the Ballroom community. In general, Black LGBT people are not able to rely on or have full access to these Black spaces – the home as a building and the biological family, and the heteronormative social arrangement and practices within this built environment that give it meaning. The ideology that sutures heterosexual gender and sexual norms to the Black home obscures, disciplines, and even jettisons all non-normative gender and sexual practices. Some Black LGBT people are either forced out of or choose to leave the biological homeplace. Those who remain often experience the home and biological family as coercive, as an often tacit (and other times explicit) ‘familial ultimatum’ that requires them to hide or dispense with their non-normative gender and sexual identities and practices in order to remain a full-fledged part of both the (biological) family and home (concrete building) in which this family lives. Full access to the heteropatriarchal homeplace affords one the shelter, clothing, food, and other resources that family and home are believed to provide. My research demonstrates a connection between the heteropatriarchal structure of the home (Johnston and Longhurst 2010) and how my interlocutors experience the most difficulty relating to and living with their fathers. For instance, when I interviewed Will, a Butch Queen, from the House of Ford in Detroit, he discussed his relationship with his parents, one in which he believes is influenced by his sexual identity. He explained that although he is close to his mother, he is basically estranged from his father because of his gay sexuality. Brianna, a Femme Queen free agent in the scene,13 discussed how her relationship with her father deteriorated, she believes, because she lives as a transgender woman. ‘I probably lost the relationship that I had with my father ... we were real close. It won’t be like it was,’ said Brianna. Although Will Ford and Brianna’s stories are among a diverse range of experiences that my interlocutors described, a common factor for most LGBT Ballroom members is that their relationships with their biological families suffered, negatively impacting their lives in the Black home, because of their non-conforming gender and sexual identities and practices. Thus, for Black LGBT people in Ballroom, the heteronormative space of the home – of the biological family, and of the heterogendered social and sexual relations – continually reproduces confinement, regulation, and exclusion. And for many, this space is often experienced in violent ways. For Black LGBT members of the Ballroom community, the social configuration of the house, the kinship system in the community, undertakes the labor that biological families and homes are either unwilling or unable to do. The reconfiguration of the biological familial home to the house of kinship for Ballroom members is one means through which they produce Black queer space. For instance, although there are times when, as Prada, a Butch Queen from the House of Escada notes, Ballroom houses are actual shelters for ‘those lost souls to craft14 and cohabitate,’ for most members of the community, the homeplace is a sociocultural undertaking rather than what Soja calls a ‘concrete spatiality’ (Soja 1989, 120). The house in the Ballroom community is performative in that it both exposes the ideological and fetishistic basis of the home and the biological family, [and] takes on the actual labor of social support, affirmation, and critique upon which the community depends in the ‘house.’

#### Thus, the alternative is to reject the aff’s intrinsic hegemonic framing to analyze familial constructs in social housing policy

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It is useful to analyze gender and familial constructs in social policy not only to raise new insights about women and their political incorporation, but also to contribute to our understanding of political institutions and processes in American political development. Furthermore, devolution and the move towards public/private partnerships has had a significant impact on social policy making and since these trends disproportionately affect women and children, it raises concerns for women's equal citizenship and access to government services increasingly dominated by the market. An investigation of how United States political actors have relied historically on shifting images of the family may help us understand contemporary movements towards family-centered policy. Examining perceptions of the family in the home may also move us closer to understanding under what types of ideological conditions states model housing policy, and contribute to the dialogue on the extent that welfare states formulate social policy based on institutional designs, economic forces, or cultural values. To put these considerations another way, much more work is needed to analyze how states respond to contingent gendered ideological messages in their housing policies and also how they rely on that ideology to both frame and legitimize their policy formulas. Throughout the last decade there was a wave of literature on housing policy changes, "welfare reform," and shifts towards prioritizing market-based policy initiatives. Many scholars have sounded the alarm of what these policies meant for our national social and economic commitments and the future of social provi sions in the United States. For example, Neil Smith argues that the 1990s marked a shift from the Keynsian and New Deal econom ics towards a revanchist urban regime, in which urban policy rep resents a backlash against liberal/progressive policy making. This movement includes intense policing by the state and neo-liberal market reforms.34 Similarly, neo-liberalism, domicide, and other geo-political catchphrases are used to understand the prolifera tion of marginalization. While these explorations are important and insightful, and urban scholars certainly have reason to worry, historically, revanchist ideology has been present for women and minorities attempting to obtain affordable housing absent of government policing. The severe societal costs of welfare state dismantling and the privatization of housing policy about which Smith warns should not be underestimated; however, focusing on recent neo-liberal reforms and redevelopment governance practices as the object of criticism obscures nuclear-family hegemony. These critiques divert attention away from understanding the multiple ways in which United States' housing policy has reproduced class, race, and gender bias since the federal govern ment was involved in housing. Women's citizenship in relation to the right to housing has always been qualified by one's ability to perform well in the market, partner with a breadwinner, withstand substandard housing conditions in public housing, or get by with little to no government assistance. Although the recent housing lending and foreclosure crisis has raised an interest in housing policy, most observations are grounded in the same gendered and racial assumptions that were pervasive prior to the crisis. There have been few challenges, in both political science and the policymak ing arena, to the widespread ideological issues embedded in fed eral housing policy. Without seriously exploring nuclear-family hegemony as it relates to housing planning and practices, the United States will continue to build upon troubling undemocratic gendered and heteronormative practices and ideologies.

#### The role of the ballot is to critically reflect and interrogate the realities of power dynamics in housing policies

Friere 70 Freire, Paulo. Pedagogy of the Oppressed 1970

#### Many Persons, bound to a mechanistic view of reality, do not perceive that the concrete situation of individuals conditions their consciousness of the world, and that in turn this consciousness conditions their attitudes and their ways of dealing with reality. They think that reality can be transformed mechanistically,6 without posing the persons false consciousness of reality as a problem or, through revolutionary action, developing a consciousness which is less and less false. There is no historical reality which is not human. There is no history without humankind, and no history for human beings; there is only history of humanity, made by people and (as Marx pointed out) in turn making them. It is when the majorities are denied their right to participate in history as Subjects that they become dominated and alienated. Thus, To supersede their condition as objects by the status of Subjects—the objective of any true revolution—requires that the people act, as well as reflect, upon the reality to be transformed. It would indeed be idealistic to affirm that, by merely reflecting on oppressive reality and discovering their status as objects, persons have thereby already become Subjects. But while this perception in and of itself does not mean that thinkers have become Subjects, it does mean, as one of my co-investigators7 affirmed, that they are "Subjects in expectancy\*—an expectancy which leads them to seek to solidify their new status. On the other hand, it would be a false premise to believe that activism (which is not true action) is the road to revolution. People will be truly critical if they live the plenitude of the praxis, that is, if their action encompasses a critical reflection which increasingly organizes their thinking and thus leads them to move from a purely naive knowledge of reality to a higher level, one which enables them to perceive the causes of reality. If revolutionary leaders deny this right to the people, they impair their own capacity to think—or at least to think correctly. Revolutionary leaders cannot think without the people, nor for the people, but only with the people. The dominant elites, on the other hand, can—and do—think without the people—although they do not permit themselves the luxury of failing to think about the people in order to know them better and thus dominate them more efficiently. Consequently, any apparent dialogue or communication between the elites and the masses is really the depositing of "communiques," whose contents are intended to exercise a domesticating influence.

#### Becoming complacent and comfortable in obedience to discriminatory practicecs or state liberation eliminates the will of the subject and replicates harms and power structures to keep the power with the master.

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The story gives us a portrait of obedience as virtue. We could thus consider how the project of eliminating willfulness relates to obedience. Aquinas in his reflection on the virtue of obedience refers to the work of Gregory who argues that obedience has “more merit” the “less it has of its own will” (Summa Theologiae, 2a.2ae.104.60). For Gregory obedience becomes a virtue when persons obey commands that do not go in the direction of their own will. There is no virtue in obeying a command that is agreeable to one’s own will: “obedience requires little or no effort when it has as its own will in agreeable things.” Rather “the effort is greater in disagreeable or difficult things.” Obedience occurs when one’s “own will tends to nothing apart from the command” (63). This is how Gregory can conclude that “by obedience we slay our own will” (64). To obey is to go where your will would not take you. Willfulness might refer to willing in agreement with one’s own will. Another way of putting this would be to say that a willful will is one that wills what it wants, and that has yet to eliminate want from will.6 As I noted in my introduction to this book, the Grimm story can be considered as part of the educational tradition described by Alice Miller (1987) as “poisonous pedagogy.” Miller draws on the earlier work of Katharina Rutschky who describes this tradition (problematically) as “Black pedagogy,” which has as its primary aim “the domination and control of the child for the child’s own good” (Zornado 2001, 79).7 As Joseph L. Zornado points out, following both Rutschky and Miller, this pedagogy rests on willfulness: “Because the child is willful, stained by original sin and destructive, the adult must enact decisive and punitive measures so that the child will not grow up ‘full of weeds’ ” (2001, 79). **The violence toward the child is thus presented as being for the child**. One of the examples of poisonous pedagogy quoted at length by Alice Miller is J. Sulzer’s An Essay on the Education and Instruction of Children (1784).8 I will follow Miller in quoting this essay at length as it gives us a fuller and affective picture of what is at stake in the history of willfulness. In Sulzer’s essay willfulness is described as that which must be “driven out” before children can receive a good education. Willfulness is an obstacle to the educable will: As far as willfulness is concerned, this expresses itself as a natural recourse in tenderest childhood as soon as children are able to make their desire for something known by means of gestures. They see something they want but cannot have; they become angry, cry, and flail about. Or they are given something that does not please them; they fling it aside and begin to cry. Th ese are dangerous faults that hinder their entire education and encourage undesirable qualities in children. If willfulness and wickedness are not driven out, it is impossible to give a child a good education. Th e moment these flaws appear in a child, it is high time to resist this evil so that it does not become ingrained through habit and the children do not become thoroughly depraved. (cited in Miller 1987, 10– 11) Indeed driving out willfulness, Sulzer suggests, should be the “main occupation” of those concerned with the education of children. He argues that driving out willfulness must be done “in a methodical manner”; other wise children “will finally become the masters of their parents and of their nursemaids and will have a bad, willful, and unbearable disposition with which they will trouble and torment their parents ever after as the well- earned reward for the ‘good’ upbringing they were given” (11). **The rod makes an appearance as the proper instrument for moral correction:** “If parents are fortunate enough to drive out willfulness from the very beginning by means of scolding and the rod, they will have obedient, docile, and good children whom they can later provide with a good education” (11). The rod and scolding are techniques of parental will that aim to create a docile child. Note here that **docility appears an end of will, as what will,** transformed into a disciplinary technique, **is intended to actualize.** As such the will seeks to eliminate the child’s will, understood as willful insofar as it is his own: “A child who is used to obeying his parents will also willingly submit to the laws and rules of reason once he is on his own and his own master, since he is already accustomed not to act in accordance with his own will. Obedience is so important that all education is actually nothing other than learning how to obey” (12, emphasis added). Becoming obedient is learning to act without accordance to one’s own will. If children are to act without self- accordance, their own will must be broken: It is not very easy, however, to implant obedience in children. It is quite natural for the child’s soul to want to have a will of its own, and things that are not done correctly in the first two years will be diffi cult to rectify thereafter. One of the advantages of these early years is that then force and compulsion can be used. Over the years, children forget everything that happened to them in early childhood. If their wills can be broken at this time, they will never remember afterwards that they had a will, and for this very reason the severity that is required will not have any serious consequences. Just as soon as children develop awareness, it is essential to demonstrate to them by word and deed that they must submit to the will of their parents. Obedience requires children to (1) willingly do as they are told, (2) willingly refrain from doing what is forbidden, and (3) accept the rules made for their sake. (13) **To eliminate willfulness is thus to eliminate not only the will defined as independence from what is willed by others, but to eliminate the very memory of this will or at least to aim for this elimination**. The child’s identification with parental will would become so complete that identification is experienced as willingness, as not only willingly doing what they are commanded to do, but as being this doing, as having always been this doing. Once the child is willing, any memory of having a will that was willing other wise is eradicated. Or at least that is the idea. A subject that is willing to obey is a subject without will: a willing subject becomes a will- less subject. What is this subject required to do? Katharina Rutschky explores how the genre of poisonous pedagogy provided the psychic conditions for the emergence of Fascism within Germany in the twentieth century (creating subjects whose obedience rested on the acceptance and perpetration of cruelty and punishment). As Alice Miller shows in For Your Own Good, we can track the emergence of poisonous pedagogy across Europe and America during the eighteenth century. Take, for example, the work of John Wesley who was influenced by Arminian doctrines. Wesley writes of children: “Break their wills betimes. Begin this work before they can run alone, before they can speak plain, before they can speak at all. Whatever pains it costs, break the will, if you would not damn the child. Let the child from a year old be taught to fear the rod; and to cry softly; from that age, make him do as he is bid, if you whip him ten times running to effect it. If you do spare the rod, you spoil the child; if you do not conquer you ruin him” (1811, 71). **If breaking the will is painful it is understood as necessary pain. This pain must be prior even to speech.** **The child must be conquered to avoid damnation**. Reading these literatures is difficult given how violence against children is rationalized and enacted in the works themselves. The works are implicated in the **histories** they enact; they **are conduits of violence**. In the brutish maxim “Spare the rod, spoil the child,” history is summarized as instruction. When reading about Wesley, I came across another text by the twentieth- century Baptist evangelical John Rice. He asks how John Wesley and his brother Christopher as leaders of the Evangelical movement and founders of Methodism were themselves taught. Rice notes: “Their mother Susannah Wesley taught them to fear the rod when they were a year old” (1946, 213). Rice himself then follows Wesley in arguing that “when the will of a child is totally subdued, and it is brought to revere and stand in awe of the parents, then a great many childhood follies and inadvertencies may be passed by. . . . No willful transgression should ever be forgiven children. . . . as self- will is the root of all sin and misery, so what ever cherishes this in children insures their after- wretchedness and irreligion” (213). After- wretchedness: this history is indeed a wretched history. To follow the figure of the willful child is to stay proximate to scenes of violence. And we learn too how those beaten by the rod become rods that beat. **This becoming is not inevitable, but it is part of a history we cannot afford to forget. It is a history still with us.**9 **Assembling a willfulness archive is a way of attending to histories that are kept alive by forgetting**